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Abstract
We consider the privacy problem in data publishing: given a relation I containing sensitive information
“anonymize” it to obtain a view V such that, on one hand attackers cannot learn any sensitive information
from V , and on the other hand legitimate users can use V to compute useful statistics on I . These are
conflicting goals. We use a definition of privacy that is derived from existing ones in the literature, which
relates the a priori probability of a given tuple t, Pr(t), with the a posteriori probability, Pr(t|V ), and
propose a novel and quite practical definition for utility. Our main result is the following. Denoting n the
size of I and m the size of the domain from which I was drawn (i.e. n < m) then: when the a priori
probability is Pr(t) = Ω(n/
√
m) for some tuples t there exists no useful anonymization algorithm, while
when Pr(t) = O(n/m) for all tuples t then we give a concrete anonymization algorithm that is both private
and useful. Our algorithm is quite different from the k-anonymization algorithm studied intensively in the
literature, and is based on random deletions and insertions to I .
1 Introduction
The need to preserve private information while publishing data for statistical processing is a widespread problem.
By studying medical data, consumer data, or insurance data, analysts can often derive very valuable statistical
facts, sometimes benefiting the society at large, but the concerns about individual privacy prevents the dissem-
ination of such databases. Today’s state of the art in data anonymization is the k-anonymity method [10]: the
privacy (or lack thereof) of k-anonymity has been studied and improved recently [9, 8, 7, 6, 11], but this method
fails to offer any formal guarantees for computing statistical properties, which limits the use of k-anonymized
data.
Clearly, any anonymization method needs to trade off between privacy and utility: removing all items from
the database achieves perfect privacy, but total uselessness, while publishing the entire data unaltered is at the
other extreme. In this paper we study the tradeoff between the privacy and the utility of any anonymization
method, as a function of the attacker’s background knowledge. When the attacker has too much knowledge,
we show that no anonymization method can achieve both. But for practical purposes one can often assume
that there is a bound on the amount of knowledge the attacker has, and then we show that the tradeoff can be
achieved by a new, and very simple anonymization algorithm.
1.1 Background
To place our work in context we describe here the problem and some of the issues raised by the k-anonymization.
Consider a database I of English test scores as shown in Table 1. It would be useful to make some form of
this data publicly available, for example in order to allow researchers in public education to study correlations
between various ages, nationalities, and test scores, without releasing the test scores of individual people. While
names have already been removed from the table, we don’t want to publish this data unchanged because an
attacker may use some of the age-nationality values to uniquely identify an individual (this was first shown by
Sweeney [10]): for example, he may know that Joe is 21 years old and of Indian Nationality and, since only one
entry in the database matches this age and nationality, the attacker can learn Joe’s test score. The problem
is to anonymize the data: more precisely to compute a view V that perturbs the data to make individual
identifications impossible. However, we need to do this such as to allow legitimate users to compute answers to
“statistical queries”. Examples of such queries are: How many people in the age group 20-30 have score greater
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Age Nationality Score
25 British 99
27 British 97
21 Indian 82
32 Indian 90
33 American 94
36 American 94
Table 1: A database I of test scores.
than 90 ? or How many people in a particular country have score less than 90 ? Users evaluate multiple queries
like these then combine their answers to derive important correlation between age, score, and nationality: they
don’t need to see individual scores.
The data anonymization problem has been studied intensively in recent years. Virtually all techniques
described in the literature are variations of the k-anonymity method [10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 11], which we illustrate next.
Note that the anonymization problem is different from the query perturbation problem, studied elsewhere [4, 3, 2].
Figure 2 shows the k-anonymity method and several variations described in the literature, for the instance
I in Table 1. k-anonymization is based on generalizing attribute values, e.g. replacing age 27 with an interval
21 − 30, or even with a wildcard ∗. Table 2(a) shows the original idea in k-anonymization [9]: generalize the
attribute values such that every tuple occurs in the data at least k times, in our case k = 2. Our hypothetical
attacker is no longer able to learn Joe’s score, since now there are 2 tuples that match Joe’s age and nationality
(in general: k tuples). But by generalizing the score values one arguably reduces the utility of the data, and for
that reason researchers have proposed to differentiate between the sensitive attribute (the score in our example)
and the quasi-identifiers (age, nationality in our case), and to anonymize only the latter: this is illustrated in our
example in Table 2(b), which is still a 2-anonymous table but on the quasi-identifiers only, while the scores are
unchanged. One problem with this approach (which is not addressed in the literature) is that it is not always
obvious how to classify attributes into quasi-identifiers and sensitive attributes, and this is presumably left to the
application: for that reason, in our paper we do not require such a classification of attributes. Continuing our
illustration, observe that by keeping the sensitive attribute unaltered one runs the risk of major privacy breaches
(as first noted in [8]). This is illustrated in Table 2(b) in the third group: all scores in this group are 94, hence
an attacker who knows that (say) Jane is an American can learn that her test score is 94. The solution proposed
in [8] is to further require the anonymized data to satisfy a condition called l-diversity, namely that in each group
there be at least l distinct values of the sensitive attribute. This is shown in Table 2(c), which is 3-anonymous
and 2-diverse: within each group, the attacker finds at least 2 (in general l) scores that could potentially belong
to a particular individual, hence, arguably he cannot guess a private piece of data with probability more than
1/l.
Thus, most of the prior research on data anonymization has focused on understanding and improving the
data’s privacy. The formal definitions of privacy in the literature rely on comparing the a priori and the a
posteriori probability of a sensitive tuple t being in the database [8]. The a priori probability Pr[t] is the
attacker’s belief before seeing the published data: for example, the attacker may believe that Joe, who 21 years
old and Indian, had a test score of 82 with probability 5%. The a posteriori probability is after seeing the
published view, Pr[t | V ]: for example, after seeing the view in Table 2 (b) the a posteriori probability of Joe
having a test score of 82 is 50%. When these two probabilities are close, or when the latter is low, then privacy
is said to be preserved. In this paper we use a formal definition of privacy that follows the same principles.
Much less understood is the data’s utility. Consider the following query: compute the number of individuals
between 26-32 years that received a score > 90: it is unclear how to estimate the query’s answer from any of these
three tables, and what guarantees this estimate offers. A definition of utility based on entropy is given in [6],
but this compares the a priori and the a posteriori distribution, and does not give any guarantees on estimating
the answer to a counting query.
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Age Nationality Score
* British 96-100
* British 96-100
* Indian 81-90
* Indian 81-90
* American 91-95
* American 91-95
(a) 2-anonymity on every attribute
Age Nationality Score
* British 99
* British 97
* Indian 82
* Indian 90
* American 94
* American 94
(b) 2-anonymity on non-sensitive attributes
Age Nationality Score
21-30 * 99
21-30 * 97
21-30 * 82
31-40 * 90
31-40 * 94
31-40 * 94
(c) 2-diversity and 3-anonymity
Age Nationality Score
25 British 99
32 Indian 90
33 American 94
36 American 94
21 British 99
32 Indian 89
28 Indian 99
29 American 81
27 American 94
32 British 83
26 American 99
39 Indian 94
(d) (d, γ)-privacy
Table 2: Different methods for computing an anonymized view V for the instance I in Table. 1.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper we study the privacy/utility tradeoff. For that we give a definition of utility based on estimating
counting queries, i.e. queries of the form count the number of records satisfying a certain predicate. Our definition
requires that all counting queries whose answer is “large” be accurately estimated from the anonymized data,
with a guarantee on the accuracy that does not depend on any additional assumptions on the original data. For
example, if the query count the number of persons with age between 26 and 32 who received a score over 90 has
a large answer (say, 1/50th of the size of the instance), then we require it to be possible to estimate it with
high accuracy from the anonymized data. None of the variations of k-anonymity described earlier allows us to
compute a good estimate to this query: for example in Table 2 (c) all six entries could have an age between 26
and 32, and the only way to estimate the query’s answer is to make further assumptions about the distribution
of the data: e.g. that ages are uniformly distributed in the interval 21-40, and that the distribution on ages is
independent on the test score. But if we ask users to know such properties about the data then we are defeating
their very purpose in analyzing the data: the users would like to discover whether age and the test score are
independent or not, and not to be required to know this in order to discover other facts.
Note that our definition of utility applies only to queries with large answers. This is crucial: queries with
small answers could leak privacy if we allow them to be estimated accurately. For example the query count the
number of Indian persons, of age 21, who received a score of 82 has answer 1 on the original data, and if we
allowed it to be estimated with high accuracy then privacy would be breached.
Our main result is an almost complete separation of the case when a private/useful anonymization algorithm
is possible from that when it is impossible, based on the attacker’s knowledge. If the attacker’s prior tuple
probability is as high as Ω(n/
√
m), where n is the size of the database and m the size of the domain D, then
an utility preserving anonymization algorithm is impossible. This impossibility result holds even when the prior
distribution is tuple independent. If the attackers attacker’s prior is O(n/m), then privacy/utility is possible.
We prove that by giving a new, and very simple anonymization algorithm: randomly remove each tuple in I
with probability α, and randomly insert each tuple in the domain D with probability β. A particular run of
this algorithm is shown in Table 2 (d): Two tuples have been removed from the original data, and eight new
tuples have been inserted. (For presentation purposes we indicate which four tuples come from I and which were
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inserted randomly: in practice this separation is hidden.) Both privacy and utility can be achieved by tuning α
and β, as long as the attacker’s prior is O(n/m). Importantly, the accuracy of any counting query is guaranteed
as a probability on the random choices made by the algorithm, without any assumptions on the original data.
The proof of our algorithm’s privacy assumes that the prior distribution is tuple independent, or that it satisfies
some very limited form of correlations. This is clearly a weakness, but in some sense it is unavoidable: we show
that if the attacker is allowed to know arbitrary tuple correlations, then no utility-preserving algorithm exists
even when the prior is Ω(n/m).
Our impossibility result extends a similar result by Dwork and Nissim [4], which was derived for a different
privacy setting. We give the formal definition of the privacy setting in Sec. 3.1. Using this notion of privacy,
they showed that no such algorithm can be useful. We improve here, the impossibility result (by tightening
the bounds, and relaxing the definition of counting queries), and show how to extend it to the more traditional
notion of privacy.
Random deletions and insertions in the database are well known privacy preserving techniques, which have
been used in a variety of settings, e.g. in private data mining [5]. Perhaps surprisingly, our algorithm is the first
application of these techniques to data publishing.
Overview Privacy and utility are defined in Sec. 2; the negative (impossibility) result is in Sec. 3, and the
positive result (the new algorithm) is in Sec. 4. Extensions to tuple correlations are discussed in Sec. 5.
2 Notations and Definitions
Let I = {t1, t2, .., tn} be a database instance where each tuple ti is drawn from a domain D of size m (i.e. I ⊆ D).
We need to design a privacy preserving algorithm A which takes as input an instance I and publishes a view
V , of the same schema as I (i.e. V ⊆ D). The view V becomes public knowledge while the original instance I
remains hidden.
Modeling the AdversaryWe model the adversary’s background knowledge using a probability distribution
Pr1 over the set of all possible database instances I. Formally, Pr1 : 2
D → [0, 1] is such that ∑I⊆D Pr1[I] = 1.
For each tuple t ∈ D we denote Pr1[t] the marginal distribution (i.e. Pr1[t] =
∑
I:t∈I Pr1[I]), and call Pr1 tuple-
independent when these are independent events. Clearly, we do not know Pr1, only the attacker knows it, and we
should design our privacy algorithm assuming the worst about Pr1. As we shall see, however, it is impossible to
achieve privacy and utility when the attacker is all powerful, hence we will make reasonable assumptions about
Pr1 below.
Modeling the Algorithm Given an instance I, a privacy-preserving algorithm A will make some random
choices and compute a view V . We denote PrI2[V ] the probability distribution on the algorithm’s outputs, i.e.
PrI2 : 2
D → [0, 1] is s.t. ∑V⊆D PrI2[V ] = 1. Unlike Pr1, we have total control over Pr2, since we design the
algorithm A.
As the algorithm A needs to be publicly known, an adversary can compute the induced probability Pr12[ti|V ]
based on his prior distribution Pr1 and the algorithm’s distribution Pr2, namely Pr12[ti|V ] =
∑
I⊆D:t∈I Pr
I
2[V ]Pr1[I].
We call Pr1[t] as the prior probability of tuple t while Pr12[t|V ] is called the posterior probability of t conditioned
on view V . Throughout this paper we assume that the adversary is computationally powerful and that Pr12[t|V ]
can always be computed by the adversary irrespective of the computation effort required.
2.1 Classification of Adversaries
Dwork’s impossibility result [3] suggest that it is impossible to anonymize data such that it is both useful and
protects against arbitrary adversaries. If taken literally, it seems to say that anonymization is hopeless. However,
there are lots of examples in practice when data is being anonymized and published under risks considered to
be acceptable, and this indicates that the privacy definition used by Dwork is too general.
We propose here to study adversaries with restricted power, based on placing a bound on his prior knowledge,
and will show that for certain values of this bound privacy is possible.
Specifically, we restrict the adversaries by assuming that for every tuple t his prior probability Pr1[t] is either
small, or equal to 1. In the first case we will seek to hide the tuple from the adversary; in the second case there’s
nothing to do, since the adversary already knows t. Another way to look at this is that we require the algorithm
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to preserve the privacy for tuples for which Pr1[t] is small: if Pr1[t] is large, we may well assume that it is 1, in
essence giving up any attempt to hide t from the adversary.
Definition 2.1. Let d ∈ (0, 1). A d-bounded adversary is one for which ∀t ∈ D, either Pr1[t] ≤ d or Pr1[t] = 1.
We also consider a sub-class of d-bounded adversaries called the d-independent adversary, which further
require Pr1 to be tuple-independent:
Definition 2.2. A d-independent adversary is a d-bounded, tuple-independent adversary.
2.2 Privacy definition and motivation
Our definition of privacy is based on comparing the prior probability Pr1[t] with the a posteriori probability
Pr12[t | V ], as standard in the literature. We consider here two definitions, one relative and one absolute, and
will prove that, in some sense, they are equivalent.
Definition 2.3. An algorithm is called (d, δ)-relative-private if the following holds for all d-independent adver-
saries Pr1, views V , and tuples t:
e−δ ≤ Pr12[t|V ]
Pr1[t]
≤ eδ
Denoting deδ = γ, the definition can be written as:
d
γ
≤ Pr12[t|V ]
Pr1[t]
≤ γ
d
Moreover, if Pr[t] ≤ d then Pr12[t|V ] ≤ γ, which justifies the following definition of absolute privacy1:
Definition 2.4. An algorithm is called (d, γ)-private if the following holds for all d-independent adversaries Pr1,
views V , and tuples t s.t. Pr1[t] ≤ d:
d
γ
≤ Pr12[t|V ]
Pr1[t]
Pr12[t|V ] ≤ γ
If tuple t fails the left (or right) inequality then we say there has been a negative (or positive) leakage,
respectively. Note that positive leakage resembles the notion of positive (ρ1, ρ2) breach as described in [5]. We
prove the following in the Appendix:
Proposition 2.5. Every (d, δ)-relative-private algorithm is (d, γ)-private for γ = deδ. Conversely, every (d, γ)-
private algorithm is (d, δ)-relative-private for
eδ =
γ
d
1− d
1− γ
2.3 Utility
As explained earlier, we are interested in supporting counting queries over some predicates. More generally, we
define a query Q to be any subset of the domain D, i.e. Q ⊆ D. The result of the query over the instance I is
simply |Q ∩ I|, which we denote as Q(I). For example, the query count the number of tuples with age between
26 and 31 and score > 91 is expressed as Q(I), where Q denotes all tuples in the domain having age in [26, 31]
score > 91.
For any algorithm A, using the knowledge of how the algorithm publishes its view one can obtain an estimate
for Q(I). Let EST (Q, V ) be the estimate2 of Q(I) as obtained from the published view V . Additionally, let
|Q(I)− EST (Q, V )| be the absolute error for a query Q. We require the algorithm to be such that EST (Q, V )
provides a good approximation for Q(I).
1Only the positive leakage is absolute. For the negative leakage an absolute definition makes no sense.
2We assume in this paper that EST is deterministic.
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Definition 2.6. A randomized algorithm A is called useful if there exists an estimator EST (Q, V ) s.t. for any
ǫ > 0 there exists a constant ρ such that for all domain size m, database size n, and query Q:
Pr2
[ |Q(I)− EST (Q, V )| ≥ ρ√n ] ≤ ǫ
2.4 Discussion
Our working definition of privacy is (d, γ)-privacy, where d intuitively corresponds to the prior, and γ to the
posterior. An intuitive reference point for d is d = n/m, since the expected size of I is n for the independent
distribution where Pr1[t] = n/m for all t. γ is larger, and should be measured in absolute values. For example,
γ = 0.05 means that the view V leaks no tuple t with more than 5% probability.
The motivation for our definition of utility is to give a guarantee on the absolute error of the estimator. It is
stated as ∀ǫ.∃ρ rather than ∀ρ.∃ǫ because the latter is trivially satisfied by any estimator (simply choose ǫ = 1).
The absolute error is expressed as ρ
√
n for two reasons. On one hand we do not want small errors: if one could
estimate Q(I) with an error < 1 then there would be privacy breaches, as we have seen. On the other we do not
want big errors: any estimator is accurate with probability 1 if the absolute error is n. In between 1 and n we
have chosen ρ
√
n.
k-anonymity and l-diversity satisfy neither (d, γ)-privacy nor usefulness. Considering a d-independent
adversary, privacy is compromised when the adversary knows that some tuples have very low probability. To see
the intuition, consider the instance in Table 2(c). Suppose a d-independent adversary is trying to find out Joe’s
test score, and he knows that Joe is likely to have a low score: i.e. the prior is such that Pr1[t] is very low for
a tuple saying that Joe’s score is greater than 95, and larger (but still ≤ d) for tuples saying that his score less
than 90. If the adversary knows that Joe’s age is less than 30, then his record is among the first three: since
the first two tuples have a very low probability (as their scores are 99, 97), the adversary concludes that Joe’s
scores is 82 with very high probability. There is no utility either. Suppose we want to estimate the number of
students between 29 and 31 years old from Table 2(c): the answer can be anywhere between 0 and 6, and, if our
estimate is the average, 3, then the only way we can guarantee any accuracy is by making assumptions on the
distribution of the data, in essence by knowing Pr1.
By contrast, the algorithm described in Sec. 4 takes two constants k, γ and is both (k nm , γ)-private and also
useful: for any ǫ, it gives ρ = 4
√
3 kγ ln(
2
ǫ ).
3 Impossibility Results
We prove here that no (d, γ)-private algorithm can provide even a weak notion of utility if d = Ω(n/
√
m). For
that we first establish an impossibility result for a weaker notion of privacy, called ǫ-indistinguishability, and a
very weak notion of utility, called meaningfulness: in this form, our result is an improvement of the impossibility
result in [4]. Then we establish an impossibility result for our notions of privacy and utility.
3.1 The Strong Impossibility Result
Consider the following alternative definition of privacy [4]:
Definition 3.1. An algorithm is ǫ-indistinguishable if for all database instances I and I ′ which disagree exactly
over a pair of tuples (i.e. |I| = |I ′| and | I − I ′ |= 2) and for all views V ,
e−ǫ ≤ Pr
I
2[V ]
PrI
′
2 [V ]
≤ eǫ
The weak notion of utility, which we call meaningfulness was first considered in [4] and is based on the notion
of statistical difference:
Definition 3.2. The statistical difference between two distributions PrA and PrB over the domain X is SD(PrA,PrB) =∑
x∈X | PrA(x)− PrB(x) |.
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Note that SD(PrA,PrB) ∈ [0, 2]: it is 0 when PrA = PrB, and is 2 when ∀x.(PrA(x) = 0 ∨ PrB(x) = 0).
We explain now informally the connection between statistical difference and utility (the formal connection is in
Prop 3.6 below). Suppose an algorithm A gives reasonable estimates to counting queries Q. Let Q be a “large”
query, i.e. if executed on the entire domain it returns sizeable fraction, say 1/5. When we estimate Q on the
view published for a particular instance I we will get some errors, which depend on actual size n = |I|. If there
is any utility to A then a user should be able distinguish between the two extreme cases, when Q(I) = n and
when Q(I) = 0. To capture this intuition, define the uniform distribution Pr1: ∀I s.t |I| = n, Pr1[I] = 1(mn) .
Note that
(
m
n
)
is the number of instances of size n. Thus Pr1 makes every instance of size n equally likely. Let
EQ be the event (|I| = n ∧ Q(I) = n), and E′Q the event (|I| = n ∧ Q(I) = 0). Then we expect to be able to
differentiate between the following two distributions: PrQA = Pr12[V |EQ] and PrQB = Pr12[V |E′Q]. To obtain a
reasonable estimate for Q, SD(PrQA,Pr
Q
B) should be large. On the other hand, if SD(Pr
Q
A,Pr
Q
B) is very small
then no reasonable estimate of the query can be obtained from any of the published views. An algorithm is
meaningless if the SD(PrQA ,Pr
Q
B) is small for a large fraction of the queries Q. An algorithm is meaningful if it
is not meaningless.
Definition 3.3. Let f < 1 be a constant independent of the domain size m and database size n. Consider all
queries Q s.t 12 (1− f) ≤ |Q|m ≤ 12 (1 + f). An algorithm A is called meaningless if SD(PrQA ,PrQB) is smaller than
1/2 for a fraction 2/3 of queries Q.
Next we state the strong impossibility result using meaningfulness as the definition of utility. For the sake of
concreteness we use the constant 1/2 for statistical difference and 2/3 for the fraction of queries in the definition
of meaningfulness. However, the impossibility result works for arbitrary constants.
Theorem 3.4 (Strong Impossibility). There exists a constant c independent of m and n such that every algorithm
which satisfies ǫ-indistinguishability with eǫ ≤ cmn2 is meaningless.
Before giving the proof, we comment on how this result extends a similar result in [4]. First, we have
generalized it to a larger class of queries: the previous result restricts the class of selection queries to certain
xor operations, here we allow arbitrary selection queries. Secondly, we improve the bound on the statistical
difference. This was possible because the original proof relies on a chaining argument which provides a bound on
the statistical difference of a function at each step of the chain to eventually compute the statistical difference of
PrA and PrB. At each step it considers tuples as points in a high dimensional space and bounds the statistical
difference of a function which satisfies ǫ-indistinguishability over tuples. We observe that each database instance
can be thought of as a point in a higher dimensional space and thus bound the statistical difference of a function
which satisfies ǫ-indistinguishability over instances.
Proof of Theorem 3.4: Consider all instances I such that |I| = n. The number of such instances with all
distinct tuples is
(
m
n
)
. Moreover, as A satisfies ǫ-indistinguishability, for any pair of instances I and I ′ where
|I| = |I ′| = n and |I − I ′| = 2,
e−ǫ ≤ Pr
I
2[V ]
PrI
′
2 [V ]
≤ eǫ
We denote by Pr12[V ] the probability that the view V is published. If Pr1 is the uniform distribution then
Pr12[V ] =
1(
m
n
) ∑
|I|=n
Pr2[V |I]
Consider a query Q s.t |Q| = mτ where 12 (1 − f) ≤ τ ≤ 12 (1 + f). Let us represent the set of instances for
which Q(I) = n as SQ. Then |SQ| is
(
mτ
n
)
. Let EQ be the event that input database instance I belongs to SQ.
Pr12[V |EQ] is the probability that the view V is published if an instance I is picked uniformly at random from
the set SQ.
Pr12[V |EQ] = 1|SQ|
∑
I∈SQ
Pr2[V |I]
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If we consider all queries Q s.t |Q| = mτ , then we see that the expectation EQ(Pr12[V |EQ]) = Pr12[V ]. We
show in Lemma B.1 that if eǫ ≤ mτ−2n2n2 then the variance of Pr[V |EQ] over Q of fixed size mτ is small and is
less than 8e
ǫPr12[V ]
2n2
mτ . Using this we can show that the statistical difference between the distributions Pr12[V ]
and Pr12[V |EQ] is small with high probability over choice of Q. As shown in Lemma B.3, with probability at
least 1− α,
SD(Pr12[V ],Pr12[V |EQ]) = O
(
eǫn2
αmτ
) 1
3
Fix α = 16 . As τ ≥ 12 (1 + f) and f is a constant independent of n and m, with probability greater than
5
6 , SD(Pr12[V ],Pr12[V |EQ]) is O
(
eǫn2
m
) 1
3
. The same holds for the statistical difference between Pr12[V ] and
Pr12[V |E′Q]. Thus with probability greater than 23 over the choice of Q,
SD(Pr12[V |EQ],Pr12[V |E′Q]) = O
(
eǫn2
m
) 1
3
Thus there exists a constant c such that if eǫ ≤ cmn2 then SD(Pr12[V |EQ],Pr12[V |E′Q]) ≤ 12 for at least 2/3 of
the queries Q making the algorithm meaningless. This completes the proof.
3.2 Impossibility for (d, γ)-Privacy
We show now how the strong impossibility result translates to our notions of privacy/utility. First, we show that
(d, δ)-relative-privacy implies ǫ-indistinguishability. Note that the former is a privacy notion about an adversary,
while the latter does not talk about any adversary. The proof of the following theorem is in the appendix.
Proposition 3.5. Every (d, δ)-relative-private algorithm satisfies ǫ-indistinguishability with ǫ = 2δ + 2 ln(2)
Next, we connect the two notions of utility:
Proposition 3.6. Any useful algorithm is also meaningful.
Proof: Consider the distributions PrQA ,Pr
Q
B defined above, for the events EQ = (Q(I) = n) ∧ (|I| = n) and
E′Q = (Q(I) = 0)∧ (|I ′| = n). Since the algorithm is useful, we will choose the value ǫ = 14 in Definition 2.6, and
obtain a value for ρ. Let I0 be the set of instances I such that Q(I) = 0 and |I| = n. Similarly, let In be the
set of instances I ′ such that Q(I ′) = n and |I ′| = n. Let V0 be the set of views V such that EST (Q, V ) ≤ ρ
√
n.
Similarly, let Vn be the set of views V
′ such that EST (Q, V ′) ≥ n− ρ√n.
As A is useful, a view V ∈ V0 would be published on any I ∈ I0 with probability greater than 34 . Thus,
Pr12[V ∈ V0|EQ] ≥ 34 . Similarly, Pr12[V ∈ Vn|E′Q] ≥ 34
If n ≥ 2ρ√n then V0 and Vn have to be disjoint. As ρ is independent of n, we can choose a large enough n
such that
√
n ≥ ρ. For those values of n, the statistical difference between PrQA and PrQB is at least 2(34 − 14 ) = 1,
for every Q. Thus any useful algorithm is also meaningful
Corollary 3.7. Let A be a meaningful algorithm and, let γ < 1 be any given number. Then there exists a
constant c independent of m,n and γ such that there is a d-independent adversary with d = 1c
γ
1−γ
n√
m
for which
one of the following is true for some tuple t
• There is positive leakage: Pr1[t] ≤ d but Pr12[t|V ] ≥ γ
• There is negative leakage: Pr12[t|V ]Pr1[t] ≤
1
c
n√
m
Proof: We can define for any algorithm
eǫ = max
I,I′
Pr2[V |I]
Pr2[V |I ′]
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for all I and I ′ which disagree in a single pair of tuples. By Theorem 3.4, the algorithm can have meaningful utility
only if eǫ = Ω( mn2 ). Using Proposition 3.5, we can infer that if the algorithm is meaningful, it cannot satisfy
(d, δ)-relative-privacy unless eδ ≥ c
√
m
n , for some constant c independent of n and m. Thus, no meaningful
algorithm can satisfy (d, γ)-privacy unless γd
1−d
1−γ ≥ c
√
m
n . As A is meaningful, at least one of the following
statements is true:
• There is positive leakage: Pr1[ti] ≤ d but Pr12[ti|V ] ≥ 11+ 1
cd
n√
m
.
In particular if d = 1c
γ
1−γ
n√
m
then Pr12[ti|V ] ≥ γ
• There is negative leakage: Pr12[ti|V ]Pr1[ti] ≤
d
γ ≤ dγ 1−γ1−d ≤ 1c n√m
This completes the proof.
4 Algorithm
As we have seen, it is impossible to guarantee absence of privacy breaches against all d-independent adversaries if
d = Ω( n√
m
). In this section, we present a simple algorithm which is (d, γ)-private. Here, d and γ are parameters
given to the algorithm. The utility of the algorithm depends on the values of d and γ and a guarantee for the
utility can be made only for d = k nm , for any fixed constant k (hence d = O(
n
m )).
Assume that the input database instance is I ⊆ D. The insert-remove algorithm computes the view V as
following:
• For every tuple in I, insert it in the V independently with probability α
• For every tuple in D which is not in I, insert it in the view V independently with probability β
• Publish D, V , α, β.
4.1 Privacy Analysis
Theorem 4.1. The insert-remove algorithm is (d, γ)-private where d ≤ γ if we choose α ≤ 1 − dγ and β ≥
d
γ (
1−γ
1−d )α
Proof: Consider any tuple t. Let Pr[t] = p ≤ d. We know that
Pr[t|V ] = Pr[V |t]Pr[t]
Pr[V |t]Pr[t] + Pr[V |t¯]Pr[t]
=
Pr[V |t]p
Pr[V |t]p+ Pr[V |t¯](1− p)
If d ≤ γ then β ≤ α. Now consider the following two cases:
• t is present in the published view. Thus Pr[V |t] = α and Pr[V |t¯] = β. Using this we get,
Pr[t|V ] = αp
αp+ β(1− p)
≤ αd
αd+ αd1−γγ
≤ γ
On the other hand, for negative leakage, note that Pr[t|V ]Pr[t] ≥ αβ ≥ 1 ≥ dγ .
• t is not present in the published view. Thus Pr[V |t] = 1− α and Pr[V |t¯i] = 1− β. Using this we get,
Pr[t|V ] = (1− α)p
(1− α)p+ (1 − β)(1 − p)
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As α ≥ β, we get αβ ≥ 1−α1−β and
(1 − α)p
(1− α)p+ (1− β)(1 − p) ≤
αp
αp+ β(1 − p)
As αpαp+β(1−p) is an increasing function of
α
β for a fixed p. Thus even in this case we have Pr[t|V ] ≤ γ.
Additionally, Pr[t|V ]Pr[t] ≥ (1−α)(1−β) ≥ 1− α ≥ dγ .
4.2 Utility Analysis
The estimator EST (Q, V ) is the following. Recall that α and β are published.
• Let nV = Q(V ); that is nV =| Q ∩ V | is the query evaluated on the view V .
• Let nD = Q(D); that is nD =| Q | is the query evaluated on the entire domain (we explain below how to
do this efficiently)
• Define:
EST (Q, V ) =
nV − βnD
α− β
Theorem 4.2. Let r be a constant and α, β be such that α ≥ 12 and β ≤ r4 nm . Then for any ǫ > 0, denoting
ρ = 2
√
3rln(2ǫ ) we have:
Pr2
[ |Q(I)− EST (Q, V )| ≥ ρ√n ] ≤ ǫ
It follows that the algorithm is useful for α ≥ 12 and β ≤ r4 nm .
Proof: Let µV be the expected number of tuples in V which satisfy the query Q. Then,
µV = αQ(I) + β(nD −Q(I))
which reduces to
Q(I) =
µV − βnD
α− β
Instead of using µV , we use nV and obtain EST (Q, V ). Thus, the absolute error Σ = |Q(I)− EST (Q, V )| is
Σ =
|µV − nV |
α− β
Using Chernoff bound we can say that with an probability 1− 2e−µV δ
2
3 , the fractional error |µV −nV |µV ≤ δ. Thus
with probability ≥ 1 − 2e−µV δ
2
3 , we know that Σ ≤ δµVα−β . Hence, for δ =
√
3ln 2
ǫ
µV
, with probability greater than
1− ǫ the following holds:
Σ ≤
√
3ln
2
ǫ
√
µV
α− β
≤
√
3ln
2
ǫ
√
Q(I)
α
+
βnD
α2
As α = 12 and β ≤ r4 nm , we can guarantee that the error Σ would be less than 2
√
3rln(2ǫ )n with probability
greater than 1− ǫ. Since ǫ was arbitrary, the algorithm is useful. This completes the proof.
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Figure 1: View Size Ratio vs γ
Assuming that d ≤ γ2 , for satisfying the trade off between privacy and utility we can choose α = 12 and a
suitable β, if
d
γ
(
1− γ
1− d )α ≤
r
4
(
n
m
)
This is true when dγ ≤ r4 nm . Thus for d = k nm , the algorithm satisfies (d, γ)-privacy and is also useful, as can be
seen by setting ρ = 4
√
3 kγ ln(
2
ǫ ) for ǫ > 0.
4.3 Discussion
Choice of parameters Suppose we want to ensure (k nm , γ)-privacy, where k is a constant, i.e. d = k
n
m is the
bound on the adversary’s prior probability, and γ is the bound on the posteriori probability that is acceptable for
us. We also want to ensure utility. Choosing α = 12 satisfies both Theorems 4.1 (assuming d/γ < 1/2) and 4.2.
Next, we choose β = kγ
n
m =
d
γ . This satisfies Theorem 4.1 (since 1 >
1−γ
1−dα), and also satisfies Theorem 4.2
whenever kγ ≤ r4 . In other words, with these choices of parameters we have (d, γ)-privacy, and a utility that is
captured by ρ = 2
√
3rln(2ǫ ), where r =
4k
γ (smaller r’s are better for utility). The privacy/utility tradeoff is like
this. We want to protect against a powerful adversary, i.e. large k: we want to protect well, i.e. small γ; and
this limits the utility expressed by r.
The View Size A concern about this algorithm is the potential size increase of the view: since most of the
privacy comes from the newly inserted tuples (i.e. β), clearly V will be larger than I. The expected size of V
is simply nα + (m − n)β. For the chosen values of α = 12 and β = kγ nm the formula reduces to n(12 + kγ ) which
means a similar tradeoff exists for the view size. Fig 1 shows the tradeoff by plotting the relationship between
size ratio of the view and γ for a fixed k = 5. The size ratio of a view V is simply |V ||I| .
The Domain If I is a table with a attributes, then we chose as domain D the cross product of all active
domains of all attributes of I, i.e. D = D1× . . .×Da, where Di = πi(I), i = 1, . . . , a. This has two implications.
First, the algorithm computes each Di, and publishes Di separately; each mi = |Di| is relatively small, while
the size of the entire domain m = m1m2 . . .ma is huge. The large size of the domain means that the estimator
needs to compute Q(D) = |Q ∩ D| efficiently. This is easy, since Q is usually a conjunction of predicates over
several attributes, hence can be computed on each Di independently. Secondly, in the insertion phase of the
algorithm tuples from the domain are added by first computing the number of tuples to be added using a binomial
distribution with parameters m − n and β. Then a sample of that size is drawn by randomly selecting tuples
from the domain without replacement.
A Case Study To understand the tradeoff between privacy and utility, we experimented with US census
data in the Adults database which has also been used for experiments in ([8],[1]). The database I has 9 attributes
and n = 30162 tuples. The product of the attributes active domains has m = 648023040 tuples, thus n/m ≈
4.65 × 10−3. We chose the parameters α and β to ensure (10n/m, 0.2)-privacy: i.e. the adversary’s prior is
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Figure 2: EST(Q,V) vs Q(I)
bounded by d = 0.465% and the posterior by γ = 20%. The upper bound on the posteriori, γ, as a theoretical
upper bound, is for an arbitrarily biased adversary: in practice, the posteriori is much smaller. We chose the
algorithm’s parameters as α = 0.5 and β = 9.5× 10−4.
Next we tested the utility of this data, by running all possible selection queries with up to three attributes.
Figure 2 shows the result. Each dot represents one query Q, where x = Q(I) and y = EST (V,Q): thus, a perfect
estimator would correspond to the y = x line. This experiments illustrates the desired behavior of our algorithm.
For small values of Q(I) the estimated values are far off (even negative): this is necessary to preserve privacy.
But for large values of Q(I) the estimations are much better and meaningful. As expected most of the values lie
in a band of width 1000 around the line y = x, thus showing that the error was indeed additive in nature.
5 Tuple correlations
So far our analysis was restricted to tuple-independent adversaries. This restriction strengthens the impossibility
result, and weakens that of the algorithm. Here we discuss several extensions to tuple correlations. First, we
show that if the adversary knows arbitrary correlations, then no algorithm can achieve both privacy and utility.
Then we examine a restricted class of correlations, which is sufficiently general to model join/link attacks: we
show that our algorithm still guarantees privacy against positive leakages (utility, of course, is unchanged), but
it cannot protect against negative leakage. The policy of protecting against positive leakage while permitting
negative leakage is sometimes acceptable in practice, and it raises the question whether our algorithm could be
strengthened in this case: after all the result in Corollary 3.7 relies on both negative and positive leakages. We
answer this negatively, by giving a variant of the impossibility result for positive leakages only.
5.1 Arbitrary Correlations
Suppose we publish a view V of a database of diseases with schema (age, zip, disease) using our algorithm. An
attacker knows the age and zipcode for both Joe and Jim. Now Joe and Jim are brothers: if one has diabetes,
then the other is quite likely to have diabetes as well (at least that’s what the attacker believes). Suppose the
attacker finds two tuples in V matching both Joe and Jim having diabetes. The probability that none was in
I and were inserted by the algorithm is very small: β2. In contrast, because of their strong correlation, the
probability that they were in the instance I is now much larger: Pr1[t ∩ t′] ≫ Pr1[t]Pr1[t′]. Thus, upon seeing
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both tuples the attacker concludes that they are Joe and Jim’s with high probability. This is the reason why
our algorithm has difficulties hiding data when the prior has correlations.
We show here that even for d ≥ nm no private and useful algorithm exists if the adversary is allowed to know
arbitrary correlations. The proof appears in the appendix.
Theorem 5.1. If A is a useful algorithm, then for any ǫ > 0 there exists n such that for every d ≥ nm there is
a d-bounded adversary and tuple t such that Pr1[t] ≤ d but Pr12[t|V ] ≥ 1− 2ǫ
5.2 Exclusions
We consider now some restricted forms of correlations: exactly one tuple from a set of tuples occurs in the
database.
Definition 5.2. A d-exclusive adversary is a d-bounded adversary with the following kind of correlations among
the tuples: There is a partition of D into a family of disjoint sets, D =
⋃
j Sj, s.t.
• Tuples are pairwise independent if they do not belong to the same set.
• Exactly one tuple in each set occurs in the database instance
This type of correlations model naturally adversaries performing join/link attacks. Such attackers are able
to determine some of the identifying attributes of a particular tuple, say the age and nationality of a person that
they know must occur in the database. The adversary can thus identify a set of tuples Sj of the domain such
that exactly one tuple in the set belongs to the database.
5.2.1 Positive results for d-exclusive adversaries
We have already seen the privacy analysis for the insert-remove algorithm against d-independent adversaries.
In this section, we show that the algorithm provides a slightly weaker form of guarantee for d-exclusive adver-
saries. We show that the algorithm ensures that there is no positive leakage for negatively correlated d-bounded
adversaries: That is if Pr1[t] ≤ d then Pr12[t|V ] ≤ γ.
Theorem 5.3. If α = 12 and β ≥ dγ (1−γ1−d ) then the algorithm ensures absence of positive leakage for all tuples
and for all d-exclusive adversaries, i.e if Pr1[t] ≤ d then Pr12[t|V ] ≤ γ
The proof of the theorem appears in the appendix. The algorithm cannot guarantee absence of negative
leakage for d-exclusive adversaries, as seen from the following example:
Example 5.4 Suppose we publish a view V of a database of diseases with schema (age, zip, disease) using
our algorithm. An attacker knows the age and zipcode of a person Joe and additionally knows that no other
person in the database has the same combination of age and zipcode. The prior belief of the attacker is that
Joe has exactly one disease but any one of the diseases is equally likely. Suppose the attacker finds a tuple t1
in V matching Joe and Diabetes. Let us consider the tuple t2 corresponding to Joe and Malaria. Theorem 5.3
shows that there won’t be a positive leakage for t1. However, for t2 there is a drastic drop in the a posteriori
probability causing a negative leakage.
5.2.2 Impossibility results for d-exclusive adversaries
In this section we extend the impossibility result for d-exclusive adversaries to accommodate the case when
negative leakage is legally allowed and only positive leakage is considered as a privacy breach. The impossibility
result shows that if an algorithm satisfies some form of weak utility then there exists a d-exclusive adversary, for
d = Ω( n√
m
), which can infer that a certain tuple exists in the database with high probability.
The extension works only for a restricted class of randomized algorithms. However, the class is broad enough
to encompass many of the privacy preserving algorithms in the literature. The class of algorithms which we
consider satisfy the following bucketization assumptions:
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• The algorithm is such that if the prior distribution is tuple independent then the posterior distribution
is also tuple independent. More formally, the tuples in the domain can be partitioned into buckets such
that the distribution Pr12[ti|V ] over the tuples obeys the following condition: If two tuples ti and tj lie in
different buckets then they are independent conditioned on the view.
• Let the number of buckets be NB. We assume that the distribution of tuples both of the database instance
and the domain among the buckets is not too skewed. More formally , for every k > 1 there exists a
Nk < NB such that if we remove any Nk buckets, the remaining still contain a fraction 1/k of tuples of I
as well as D.
For example consider the method of full domain generalization (in [7]) as applied to ensure k-anonymity or
the anatomy method (in [11]) as applied to ensure l-diversity. For both the methods the tuples corresponding
to the different anonymized groups form buckets which satisfy the assumptions above.
To show the impossibility result for d-independent adversaries, we used ǫ-indistinguishability as the privacy
definition and meaningfulness as the utility definition. Impossibility result for d-exclusive adversaries requires a
slight modification to both privacy and utility definitions.
Definition 5.5. Consider all database instances I and I ′ which disagree exactly over a pair of tuples (i.e.
|I| = |I ′| and | I − I ′ |= 2). An algorithm satisfies ǫ-indistinguishability over a set D′, if for all database
instances I and I ′ which disagree exactly over a pair of tuples with both the tuples in D′ and for all views V ,
e−ǫ ≤ Pr
I
2 [V ]
PrI
′
2 [V ]
≤ eǫ
Thus ǫ-indistinguishability over a setD′ is a relaxation of the original ǫ-indistinguishability definition. Next we
consider the notion of utility called k-meaninglessness. The notion of utility is a generalization of meaninglessness
and is also defined for counting queries Q s.t 12 (1 − f) ≤ |Q|m ≤ 12 (1 + f), for a constant f < 1. Intuitively, the
definition tries to capture the fact that an algorithm will have bad utility if many queries Q have an error of
O(n) in their estimates.
Definition 5.6. An algorithm is called k-meaningless, if there is a set S with |S| ≤ n(1 − 1k ) such that the
distributions Pr′QA and Pr
′Q
B have a statistical difference smaller than 1/2 for a fraction 2/3 of the queries Q.
Pr′QA : Pr12[V |EQ] where EQ is the event Q(I) = |Q ∩ S| and |I| = n
Pr′QB : Pr12[V |E′Q] where E′Q is the event Q(I) = |Q ∩ S|+ nk and |I| = n
Note that for k = 1, the definition reduces to notion of meaninglessness. k-meaninglessness follows the same
intuition: If SD(Pr′QA , P r
′Q
B ) is small then it would be impossible to distinguish whether the original answer is
|Q∩S| or |Q∩S|+ nk thus resulting in an error of at least nk . Cor. 5.7 relates the notions of ǫ-indistinguishability
over the set D′ and k-meaninglessness; the proof appears in the appendix.
Corollary 5.7. Let D′ be a set of tuples such that |D′| ≥ mk and |D′ ∩ I| ≥ nk , for some constant k independent
of m and n. Then there exists a constant c such that every algorithm which satisfies ǫ-indistinguishability over
the set D′ with eǫ ≤ cmn2 is k-meaningless.
We call any algorithm which is not k-meaningless as k-meaningful. As any algorithm which is meaningless is
also k-meaningless, it implies that every k-meaningful algorithm is meaningful.
Theorem 5.8. Let A be k-meaningful algorithm which satisfies the bucketization assumptions with Nk ≥ 3d .
Then there exists a constant c independent of n and m for which there is a d-exclusive adversaries with d =
max( 3Nk , c
n√
m
) having positive leakage on some tuple.
The proof of Theorem 5.8 appears in the appendix. We give a brief overview outlining the intuition: We argue
that for a k-meaningful algorithm which satisfies the bucketization assumptions, there exists a d′-independent
adversary for which either there is a positive leakage on one tuple or there is negative leakage on lot of tuples. The
presence of multiple negative leakages is shown by using the fact that, for a k-meaningful algorithm, any large set
containing a significant fraction of tuples of the database will have leakage on some tuple. Using the bucketization
assumption we prove that if there is no positive leakage, then many buckets will contain tuples having negative
leakage. In case of positive leakage we are done as the d′-independent adversary serves as d-exclusive adversaries.
In the case of multiple negative leakages, we explicitly construct a d-exclusive adversary using the d′-independent
adversary such that there is positive leakage for at least one tuple. Here, we use d′ = d/3.
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6 Conclusions
We have described a formal framework for studying both the privacy and the utility of an anonymization
algorithm. We proved a tight bound between privacy and utility, based on the attacker’s power. For the case
where privacy/utility can be guaranteed, we have described a new, quite simple anonymization algorithm, based
on random insertions and deletions of tuples in/from the database. We have done a limited empirical study, and
saw a good privacy/utility tradeoff. Our algorithm increases the size of the data, but by tolerable amounts (a
factor of 10, in our empirical study). It will be interesting to study in future work ways to reduce the size of the
published view.
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A Relationships among privacy definitions
A.1 (d, γ)-privacy and (d, δ)-relative-privacy
Proposition (2.5). Every (d, δ)-relative-private algorithm is (d, γ)-private for γ = deδ. Conversely, every (d, γ)-
private algorithm is (d, δ)-relative-private for
eδ =
γ
d
1− d
1− γ
Proof: The proof of the first part trivially follows from the definitions. For the converse let A be a (d, γ)-private
algorithm. Thus A ensures no positive/negative leakage for all d-independent adversaries. We shall use this
fact to show that A should satisfy (d, δ)-relative-privacy. For this we consider Pr12[ti|V ] purely as a function
of Pr1[t1] while keeping the prior probability of all other tuples constant. Let us call the function as f . We
compute the function explicitly as:
Pr12[ti|V ] = Pr12[V ∩ ti]
Pr12[V ∩ ti] + Pr12[V ∩ t¯i] =
ΣIj∈ItPr12[V ∩ Ij ]
ΣIj∈ItPr12[V ∩ Ij ] + ΣI′j∈It¯Pr12[V ∩ I ′j ]]
=
ΣIj∈ItPr2[V |Ij ]Pr1[Ij ]
ΣIj∈ItPr2[V |Ij ]Pr1[Ij ] + ΣI′j∈It¯Pr2[V |I ′j ]Pr1[I ′j ]
Here, It represent the set of instances which contain ti and It¯ represent the set which does not. For each instance
Ij in the set It we can decompose Pr1[Ij ] as Pr1[ti]Pr1[Tj ] where Tj is the event that denotes that only the
tuples in Ij except for ti occur in the database. This decomposition is possible because of tuple independence in
Pr1. Using this decomposition we can rewrite Pr12[t1|V ] as
c1Pr1[ti]
c1Pr1[ti] + c2(1− Pr1[ti])
where c1 and c2 are constants as we vary Pr1[ti] and keep the prior probabilities of all other tuples constant.
Let us represent Pr12[ti|V ] as the function
f(x) =
c1x
c1x+ c2(1− x) .
We notice that the function is increasing in x and has slope c1c2 at the origin. Additionally, if c1 ≥ c2 then
f(x) ≥ x for all x. On the other hand if c1 < c2 then f(x) ≤ x for all x. We are interested in the maximum and
minimum possible values of f(x)x . The maximum occurs when c1 > c2 at points near the origin and is equal to
c1
c2
. The fact that A has be safe from privacy leakages imposes certain restrictions on f . One condition is that
f(d) ≤ γ which implies that c1c2 ≤
γ(1−d)
(1−γ)d . Another is that ∀x : f(x)x ≥ dγ . It follows that such an algorithm A is
also (d, δ)-relative-private for eδ = max(γ(1−d)(1−γ)d ,
γ
d ) =
γ(1−d)
(1−γ)d .
A.2 (d, δ)-relative-privacy and ǫ-indistinguishability
For proving Proposition 3.5, we need to show the following lemma,
Lemma A.1. Let A be a (d, δ)-relative-private algorithm. Then, for all tuples ti such that Pr1[ti] ≤ d,
1− deδ
1− d ≤
Pr12[t¯i|V ]
Pr1[t¯i]
≤ 1−
d
eδ
1− d (1)
Proof: Assume Pr1(ti) ≤ d. Additionally, we know that
e−δ ≤ Pr12[ti|V ]
Pr1[ti]
≤ eδ
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It is easy to see that using the above two inequalities we can bound Pr12[t¯i|V ]Pr1[t¯i] as required. This completes the
proof.
Using sandwich theorem on (1), we note that
limd→0(
Pr12[t¯i|V ]
Pr1[t¯i]
) = 1
Thus, for any given δ, we can choose d small enough such that 12 ≤ Pr12[t¯i|V ]Pr1[t¯i] ≤ 2
Proposition (3.5). Every (d, δ)-relative-private algorithm satisfies ǫ-indistinguishability with ǫ = 2δ + 2 ln(2)
Proof: Consider a d′ for which Pr′1 is such that
1
2
≤ Pr
′
12[t¯i|V ]
Pr′1[t¯i]
≤ 2 (2)
We know that such a d′ exists for every δ. If d ≤ d′ then we let Pr′1 = Pr1. On the other hand if d > d′,
then we use the fact any (d, δ)-relative-private algorithm would also be (δ, d′)-private algorithm and hence from
here on we consider the algorithm as (δ, d′)-private and assume that equation (2) holds true for Pr1.
Consider any two database instances I and I ′′ which differ in exactly one tuple with I containing one extra
tuple t1. Then we can represent I as t1 ∩ T and I ′′ as t¯1 ∩ T . Here T represents the event that all tuples in I ′′
belong to the database and all tuples in I¯ do not belong to the database.
Pr2[V |I]
Pr2[V |I ′′] =
Pr2[V |(t1 ∩ T )]
Pr2[V |(t¯1 ∩ T )] =
Pr12[V ∩ t1 ∩ T ]
Pr12[V ∩ t¯1 ∩ T ]
Pr1[t¯1]
Pr1[t1]
=
Pr12[t1|(V ∩ T )]
Pr12[t¯1|(V ∩ T )]
Pr1[t¯1]
Pr1[t1]
=
Pr12[t1|(V ∩ T )]
Pr12[t1|V ]
Pr12[t¯1|(V ∩ T )]
Pr2[t¯1|V ]
Pr12[t1|V ]
Pr1[t1]
Pr12[t¯1|V ]
Pr1[t¯1]
Consider a d-independent adversary for which Pr1[T ] = 1 but Pr1[t1] ≤ d. As the algorithm satisfies
(d, δ)-relative-privacy, it should be safe against such an adversary. Thus,
e−δ(
1
2
) ≤ Pr2[V |I]
Pr2[V |I¯ ′′]
≤ eδ(2)
Similarly consider the database instances I ′ and I ′′ such that I ′ has one extra tuple t2. Again, we observe that
e−δ(
1
2
) ≤ Pr2[V |I
′]
Pr2[V |I¯ ′′] ≤ e
δ(2)
Thus, combining the two inequalities we can see that there exists an ǫ = 2(δ + ln(2)) such that
e−ǫ ≤ Pr2[V |I
′]
Pr2[V |I] ≤ e
ǫ
This completes the proof.
B The strong Impossibility result
Lemma B.1. if eǫ ≤ mτ−2n2n2 then VarQ(Pr12[V |EQ]) ≤ 8e
ǫPr12[V ]
2n2
mτ
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Proof: Let x denote a database instance of size n and let p(x) denote Pr12[V |x]. Thus, Pr12[V ] is exactly
Exp(x) =
∑
x
p(x)
(mn)
. Additionally, Pr12[V |EQ] = Ex∈SQp(x) =
∑
x∈SQ
p(x)
(mτn )
. Note that EQ(Pr12[V |EQ]) =
Pr12[V ]. We want to compute VarQ(Pr12[V |EQ]). Let χQ(x) denote the indicator variable corresponding to
the event x ∈ SQ.
VarQ(Pr12[V |EQ]) = EQ(
∑
x p(x)χQ(x)(
mτ
n
) )2 − (∑x p(x)(m
n
) )2
=
1(
mτ
n
) n∑
i=0
∑
|x−y|=2i
p(x)p(y)(
m
n
)(
m−n
i
)(
n
n−i
)
[(
mτ − n
i
)(
n
n− i
)
−
(
m− n
i
)(
n
n− i
)(mτ
n
)(
m
n
)
]
=
1(
mτ
n
) n∑
i=0
ai(ci − di)
=
1(
mτ
n
) n∑
i=0
aibi
Here |x− y| is the symmetrical difference between the instances x and y. Thus |x− y| represents the number
of tuples in which x and y disagree. We use the notation ai =
∑
|x−y|=2i
p(x)p(y)
(mn)(
m−n
i )(
n
n−i)
, ci =
(
mτ−n
i
)(
n
n−i
)
,
di =
(
m−n
i
)(
n
n−i
) (mτn )
(mn)
and bi = ci − di.
Note that
∑
i bi = 0. Moreover we can rewrite bi as the product of
(
m−n
i
)(
n
n−i
)
and
(mτ−ni )
(m−ni )
− (
mτ
n )
(mn)
. We can see
that the first factor is always positive while the second factor decreases as i increases. Thus bi ≤ 0 =⇒ bi+1 ≤ 0.
For the sequence ai it is easy to see that
∑
i ai
(m−ni )(
n
n−i)
(mn)
=
∑
x
p(x)2
(mn)
2 = Pr12[V ]
2. Due to property of
ǫ-indistinguishability we know that if |x− y| = 1 then e−ǫ ≤ p(x)p(y) ≤ eǫ. Using this we show in Lemma B.2 that
∀i, e−ǫ ≤ aiai+1 ≤ eǫ.
Let i0 be the largest index s.t. bi0 > 0. Then bi0+1 ≤ 0 and thus
(mτ−ni0+1 )
(mτn )
≤ (
m−n
i0+1
)
(mn)
. As
∑n
i=0 ai
(m−ni )(
n
n−i)
(mn)
=
Pr12[V ]
2, we know that in particular
ai0+1
(
m−n
i0+1
)(
n
n−i0−1
)
(
m
n
) ≤ Pr12[V ]2
=⇒ ai0
eǫ
(
m−n
i0+1
)(
n
n−i0−1
)
(
m
n
) ≤ Pr12[V ]2
=⇒ ai0
eǫ
(
mτ−n
i0+1
)(
n
n−i0−1
)
(
m/2
n
) ≤ Pr12[V ]2
=⇒ ai0
(
mτ−n
i0
)(
n
n−i0
)
(
mτ
n
) (mτ − n− i0)(n− i0)
(i0 + 1)2
≤ eǫPr12[V ]2
=⇒ ai0
(
mτ−n
i0
)(
n
n−i0
)
(
mτ
n
) ≤ n2eǫPr12[V ]2
mτ − 2n
=⇒ ai0ci0(mτ
n
) ≤ 2n2eǫPr12[V ]2
mτ − 2n
If eǫ ≤ mτ−2n2n2 then aici ≤ ai+1ci+12 for all i. Thus the entire sum 1(mτn )
∑n
i=0 aibi can be bounded as
1
(mτn )
∑i0
i=0 aici ≤
2ai0ci0
(mτn )
≤ 4n2eǫ ¯Pr12[V ]
2
mτ−2n . As m is much larger than n and τ is a constant, we can assume that mτ ≥ 4n. Thus we
get that VarQ(Pr12[V |EQ]) ≤ 8n
2eǫ ¯Pr12[V ]
2
mτ . This completes the proof.
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Lemma B.2. ∀i, e−ǫ ≤ aiai+1 ≤ eǫ.
Proof: Let Sxi be the set of instances {y | |x− y| = 2i}
ai =
∑
|x−y|=2i
p(x)p(y)(
m
n
)(
m−n
i
)(
n
n−i
)
=
∑
x
p(x)(
m
n
)

∑
y∈Sxi
p(y)(
m−n
i
)(
n
n−i
)


For each y, consider the set of instances Sy obtained by removing one of the i tuples in y by one of the i tuples
of x. Hence there are i2 such instances. Note that ∀y′ ∈ Sy, p(y′) ≤ eǫp(y). On the other hand each instance
y′ ∈ ∪y∈Sx
i
Sy is obtained from exactly (n− i + 1)(m− n− i+ 1) instances from Sxi . Thus
ai ≥
∑
x
p(x)(
m
n
)

 ∑
y′∈Sxi−i
(n− i+ 1)(m− n− i+ 1)
i2
(
m−n
i
)(
n
n−i
) p(y′)
eǫ


≥
∑
x
p(x)(
m
n
)

 ∑
y′∈Sxi−i
p(y′)
eǫ
(
m−n
i−1
)(
n
n−i+1
)

 = ai−1
eǫ
.
Similarly we can show that ai ≤ eǫai−1. This completes the proof
Lemma B.3. With probability at least (1 − α), SD(Pr[z], P rS [z]) ≤ O
(
eǫn2
αmτ
) 1
3
Proof: The proof is exactly the same as in the proof of Lemma 2 shown in [4].
C Tuple correlations
C.1 Arbitrary correlations
Theorem. 5.1 If A is a useful algorithm, then for any ǫ > 0 there exists n such that for every d ≥ nm there is a
d-bounded adversary and tuple t such that Pr1[t] ≤ d but Pr12[t|V ] ≥ 1− 2ǫ
Proof: Let I be the input instance and n = |I|. Consider a d-bounded adversary with the following tuple
correlations: The adversary knows that either all tuples of the set S = I belong to the database or none of the
tuples belong to the database. Consider the query Q = S. As the algorithm is useful, for every ǫ there exists a
ρ such that the |EST (Q, V )−Q(I)| ≤ ρ√n with probability greater than ǫ. If n is large enough, then it follows
that algorithm cannot output the same view on I and any instance I ′ in the set {I ′|S ⊂ D− I ′} with probability
greater than 2ǫ. Hence, from the view there will be a breach with probability greater than 1− 2ǫ.
C.2 d-exclusive adversaries
C.2.1 Positive result for d-exclusive adversaries
Theorem (5.3). If α = 12 and β ≥ 2 dγ (1−γ1−d ) then the insert-remove algorithm ensures absence of positive leakage
for all tuples and for all d-exclusive adversaries, i.e if Pr1[t] ≤ d then Pr12[t|V ] ≤ γ
Proof: The probability Pr[ti|V ] is only dependent on which tuples in S appear in V . It is clear that maximum
privacy leakage happens when V contains ti but does not contain any other tuple from S. In that case, Pr[V |ti] =
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α(1−β)(|S|−1) and Pr[V |tj ] = β(1−α)(1−β)(|S|−2) . Also, let Pr[ti] = p. For a d-exclusive adversary t¯i = ∪j 6=itj .
Thus we get,
Pr[ti|V ] = α(1 − β)p
α(1 − β)p+ β(1 − α)(1 − p)
As p ≤ d, α = 12 and β ≥ dγ (1−γ1−d ), we get Pr[ti|V ] ≤ γ. This completes the proof.
C.3 Impossibility result for d-exclusive adversaries
Corollary (5.7). Let D′ be a set of tuples such that |D′| ≥ mk and |D′∩I| ≥ nk , for some constant k independent
of m and n. Then there exists a constant c such that every algorithm which satisfies ǫ-indistinguishability over
the set D′ with eǫ ≤ cmn2 is k-meaningless.
Proof: We can think of a random Q with |Q| = m(1−f)2 as picking a random subset of size m(1−f)2 from D. Let X
stand for the random variable denoting the number of tuples in D′ which are also in Q. Then E(X) = |D
′|(1−f)
2
and Var(X) = |D
′|(1−f)
4 . If |D′| > mk then using Chernoff inequality we can show that with probability greater
1− 2e− m16k the random subset will have size between m(1−f)2k and 3m(1−f)2k in D′.
Let I ′ = D′ ∩ I, then using Theorem 3.4 for tuples in I ′ we can show that with probability greater than 23 ,
the statistical difference between Distribution 0’ and Distribution 1’ is at most O
(
eǫn2
m
) 1
3
+ 2e
− m
16k2 which is
dominated by O
(
eǫn2
m
) 1
3
.
Distribution 0’: Pr12[V |E] where E is the event Q(I ′) = 0
Distribution 1’: Pr12[V |E′] where E′ is the event Q(I ′) = |I ′|
This shows the distributions Pr′QA and Pr
′Q
B have statistical difference O
(
eǫn2
m
) 1
3
with probability greater than
2
3 , where
Pr′QA : Pr12[V |EQ] where EQ is the event Q(I) = |Q ∩ I ′|
Pr′QB : Pr12[V |E′Q] where E′Q is the event Q(I) = |Q ∩ I ′|+ nk
If eǫ = O( mn2 ), then A is k-meaningless.
Theorem (5.8). Let A be k-meaningful algorithm which satisfies the bucketization assumptions with Nk ≥ 2d .
Then there exists a constant c independent of n and m for which there is a d-exclusive adversary with d =
max( 3Nk , c
n√
m
) having positive leakage on some tuple.
Proof: As A is k-meaningful, it is also meaningful. By Corollary 3.7 we know that there exists a d′-independent
adversary Ad1 which either has a positive leakage or negative leakage. Here we use d
′ such that d′ = d3 . If it has
positive leakage then that adversary serves as the required d-exclusive adversary. On the other hand, if it has
negative leakage on tuple t1 we choose the bucket B1 which contains that tuple. The set D
′ = D − B1 is thus
the set of tuples which are conditionally independent of tuple t1.
Let us define, I ′ = I ∩D′. We know from the bucketization assumptions that |D′| ≥ |D|k and I ′ ≥ |I|k . Let us
define, eǫ = maxI,I′
Pr2[V |I]
Pr2[V |I′] for all I and I
′ which disagree over a single pair of tuples with both of them in D′.
As A is k-meaningful, from Corollary 5.7, we know that eǫ = Ω(mn2 ). By restricting over the set D
′ and using
Corollary 3.7, it follows that there exists a d′-independent adversary Ad′2 for which there is a leakage for some
tuple t2 in the set D
′. If there is positive leakage for t2 then Ad′2 serves as the required d-exclusive adversary. If
there is negative leakage on t2 then let the bucket which contains it be B2. Consider the adversary Ad2 which
has prior of Ad′2 for tuples in B2 and prior of Ad1 for tuples in B1. As the posterior probabilities of tuples in
B2 are independent of that of tuples in B1 even conditioned on V , the leakages for Ad
′
2 in B2 and for Ad1 in B1
would be preserved for Ad2. Thus, Ad2 has negative leakage for both tuples t1 and t2.
We repeat this procedure 3d times, with buckets being Bi for i ∈ [1, 3d ]. Define B = ∪iBi and DB = D − B.
As Nk ≥ 3d , by the bucketization assumptions on the algorithm, it follows |DB| ≥ mk and |DB ∩ I| ≥ nk . Hence,
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Corollary 5.7 holds for each step and we can show that there is either a d′-independent adversary for which
there is positive leakage on some tuple or there exists a d′-independent adversary Ad for which there is negative
leakage on at least 3d tuples. In the former case, we have the required d-exclusive d-bounded adversary. For
the latter case, let the set of tuples with negative leakage be S′. We know that each tuple in S′ belongs to a
different bucket. Thus, we can increase the prior probability of each tuple ti in S so that Pr1[ti] = d
′. The
negative leakage on each ti ∈ S is still preserved because as shown in the proof of Proposition 2.5, the ratio
Pr12[ti|V ]
Pr1[ti]
increases by at most 11−d′ if we increase Pr1[ti] to d
′ while keeping the prior probability of all other
tuples constant. For d′ ≤ 12 , the increase in the ratio is by a factor of at most 2, thus preserving the negative
leakage.
Additionally there exists at least one tuple for which the prior Pr1 of Ad is such that Pr12[tp|V ] = cd′. This
is because DB contains at least
m
k tuples and Ad can have any prior probabilities for each one of them as they
will never effect the posterior probabilities of the leaking tuples. So, we can change the prior of any tuple in D′
so as to get the required posterior probability for tp. This is shown in Lemma C.1 proved in the appendix. Let
us define S as S′ ∪ tp
Using Ad we construct a d-exclusive adversary Ad′ having positive leakage on tuple tp. Ad′ corresponds to
the adversary who knows exactly one tuple in S occurs in the database instance. We construct Ad′ from Ad
by making the prior probability of each illegal instance (instances which do not exactly one tuple from S) as 0.
We do this by distributing the probability of each such illegal instance over the entire set of legal instances such
that the probability of every legal instance increases by an amount proportional to its original probability. Let
L denote the set of legal instances and IL denote set of illegal instances.
For Ad, Let us call τ =
∑
I′∈IL Pr
Ad
1 [I
′]. We know that τ = 1− (1− d′)( 1d′−1) ≤ 1− 1e . In Ad′ this sum gets
distributed to every legal instance and thus PrAd
′
1 [I] = Pr
Ad
1 [I](
1
1−τ ) for every legal instance I. We know that
PrAd
′
1 [ti] ≤ PrAd1 [ti] 11−τ ≤ d′e ≤ d. Thus Ad′ is d-bounded. Lemma C.2, proved in the appendix, shows that
the constructed adversary Ad′ is indeed d-exclusive. We next show that there is a positive leakage on tuple tp
for Ad′. Let us compute for any ti in S′ and tp the ratio
PrAd
′
12 [ti|V ]
PrAd
′
12 [tp|V ]
=
∑
I⊃ti Pr2[V |I]PrAd
′
1 [I]∑
I′⊃ti Pr2[V |I ′]PrAd
′
1 [I
′]
(3)
=
∑
I⊃ti Pr2[V |I]PrAd1 [I]( 11−τ )∑
I′⊃ti Pr2[V |I ′]PrAd1 [I ′]( 11−τ )
(4)
=
∑
I⊃ti Pr2[V |I]PrAd1 [I]∑
I′⊃ti Pr2[V |I ′]PrAd1 [I ′]
=
PrAd12 [ti|V ]
PrAd12 [tp|V ]
(5)
≤
n√
m
d′
cd
≤ 1
c′
n√
m
(6)
Note that (4) can be derived from (3) as both the summation are being done over a subset of legal instances.
Also (6) is true as there is negative leakage for ti and Pr
Ad
12 [tp|V ] = cd. Note that (6) holds for all ti in S′.
Moreover, we know that ∑
i∈S′
PrAd
′
12 [ti|V ] + PrAd
′
12 [tp|V ] = 1
Thus PrAd
′
12 [tp|V ] is at least 11+ 1
c′d
n√
m
. Hence there exists a d-exclusive adversary for which there is positive
leakage for at least one tuple. This completes the proof.
Lemma C.1. Let A be a k-meaningful algorithm. Let D′ ⊂ D be a set of tuples such that |D′| ≥ mk and
|D′ ∩ I| ≥ nk . Then there exists a tuple t in D′ such that Pru12[t|V ] ≥ c′ nm for the uniform tuple independent
distribution Pru1 and some constant c
′ independent of n and m.
Proof: We know that for any query Q,
EST (Q, V )D =
∑
ti∈D
Pru12[ti|V ]
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If we restrict the EST(Q,V) over tuples in D′, then
EST (Q, V )D′ =
∑
ti∈D′
Pru12[ti|V ]
Let us define I ′ = D′ ∩ I. For the algorithm to have some utility over domain D′, there exists a constant l
with l > k for which some query Q has the following properties: |Q ∩ I ′| ≥ nk and EST (Q, V )D′ ≥ nl . If not
then it would be impossible to distinguish whether Q(I) ≥ nk or Q(I) ≤ nl from the view for every query Q.
As EST (Q, V )D′ =
∑
ti∈D′ Pr
u
12[ti|V ] ≥ nl . This means, there exists a tuple t in D′ such that Pru12[t|V ] ≥ nlm .
Hence proved.
Note that
Pru12[t|V ]
Pru
1
[t] =
1
l . As shown in the proof of Proposition 2.5 increasing the prior probability to d will
change the ratio of posterior to prior probability to dd+l ≤ d2l . Thus, for the tuple t there exist Pr1 such that
Pr12[t|V ] ≥ cd.
Lemma C.2. The constructed adversary Ad′ is d-exclusive
Proof: We show that Ad′ is d-exclusive adversary by first showing that all tuples t1 and t2 which are not in S
are still independent. Let us define E as the event that exactly one tuple in S occurs in the database. We know
that
PrAd1 [t1 ∩ t2 ∩ E] =
PrAd1 [t1 ∩ E]PrAd1 [t2 ∩ E]
PrAd1 [E]
=
(
∑
I∈LI|I⊃t1 Pr
Ad
1 [I])(
∑
I∈LI|I⊃t2 Pr
Ad
1 [I])∑
I∈IL Pr
Ad
1 [I]
= (1− τ)
(
∑
I∈LI|I⊃t1 Pr
Ad′
1 [I])(
∑
I∈LI|I⊃t2 Pr
Ad′
1 [I])∑
I∈IL Pr
Ad′
1 [I]
= (1− τ)Pr
Ad′
1 [t1 ∩ E]PrAd
′
1 [t2 ∩E]
PrAd
′
1 [E]
Additionally, we can also compute PrAd1 [t1 ∩ t2 ∩ E] as
PrAd1 [t1 ∩ t2 ∩ E] =
∑
I∈LI|I⊃t1,t2
PrAd1 [I] = (1− τ)
∑
I∈LI|I⊃t1,t2
PrAd
′
1 [I]
= (1− τ)PrAd′1 [t1 ∩ t2 ∩ E]
As PrAd
′
1 [E] = 1, we get Pr
Ad′
1 [t1∩ t2] = PrAd
′
1 [t1]Pr
Ad′
1 [t2]. Also, the prior of Ad
′ is such that
∑
t∈S Pr1[t] = 1.
Thus the adversary is indeed d-exclusive.
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